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Social runaway: Fisherian elaboration (or reduction) 
of socially selected traits via indirect genetic effects 
Our understanding of the evolutionary stability of socially-selected traits is dominated by sexual 
selection models originating with R. A. Fisher, in which genetic covariance arising through 
assortative mating can trigger exponential, runaway trait evolution. To examine whether non-
reproductive, socially-selected traits experience similar dynamics—social runaway—when 
assortative mating does not automatically generate a covariance, we modelled the evolution of 
socially-selected badge and donation phenotypes incorporating indirect genetic effects (IGEs) 
arising from the social environment. We establish a social runaway criterion based on the 
interaction coefficient, , which describes social effects on badge and donation traits. Our models 
make several predictions. (1) IGEs can drive the original evolution of altruistic interactions that 
depend on receiver badges. (2) Donation traits are more likely to be susceptible to IGEs than 
badge traits. (3) Runaway dynamics in non-sexual, social contexts can occur in the absence of a 
genetic covariance. (4) Traits elaborated by social runaway are more likely to involve reciprocal, 
but non-symmetrical, social plasticity. Models incorporating plasticity to the social environment 
via IGEs illustrate conditions favouring social runaway, describe a mechanism underlying the 
origins of costly traits such as altruism, and support a fundamental role for phenotypic plasticity in 
rapid social evolution. 
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social selectionTraits involved in social interactions are expected to have different evolutionary 
dynamics than non-social traits (West-Eberhard 1983). Such dynamics include how fast they evolve, 
whether different traits coevolve in a mutually reinforcing or antagonistic manner, how elaborated 
they can ultimately become, and their evolutionary persistence. While much theoretical effort has 
clarified the evolutionary dynamics of a wide variety of socially-selected traits over the last century, 
our understanding of the evolutionary stability vs. instability of socially-selected traits has arguably 
been dominated by sexual selection models. That is because for sexually-selected traits, conditions 
favouring instability – i.e. non-linear, exponential, or otherwise chaotic exaggeration or decay of 
traits – have been found to depend on genetic covariance arising through assortative mating, 
triggering exponential, “runaway” trait evolution. However, the potential for similar runaway 
dynamics when assortative mating does not automatically generate a covariance is less clearly 
understood. Here, we explore this scenario by modelling ‘social runaway’ in non-sexual, social traits 
using a quantitative genetic framework that accounts for several of the distinctive characteristics of 
such traits. Without loss of generality, we focus our analyses on a specific, tractable example of such 
traits, resource donation and elicitation, which are relevant for understanding many social processes 
  
 
in behavioural and evolutionary ecology such as parent-offspring conflict, sibling rivalry, altruism, 
cooperative breeding, and others. 
One unique characteristic of traits with social functions is that they can generate social selection, 
that is, “differential reproductive success…due to differential success in social competition, whatever 
the resource at stake” (West-Eberhard 1983, p. 158). Another is that the social environment an 
individual experiences can influence the expression of traits under selection (as opposed to 
influencing the selection itself), through socially-mediated plastic responses (Cardoso et al. 2015). 
For example, variation in the social environment can affect the expression of: aggression during 
agonistic encounters (Rodenburg et al. 2008), mate preferences (Collins 1995, Hughes et al. 1999), 
parental care (Royle et al. 2012), social learning (Battesti et al. 2012), and offspring solicitation in 
species where parents or helpers provide care (Velando et al. 2013; Mas and Kölliker 2008). Social 
environments may vary because of genes that are expressed by interacting social partners, and 
indirect genetic effects (IGEs) arise when individuals experiencing such social environments express 
different trait values as a result (Moore 1997). The evolutionary consequences of IGEs can be distinct 
and unusual, because the social environment may contain a genetic component that itself evolves. 
For this reason, an IGE framework is useful for exploring evolutionary dynamics of social traits such 
as aggression, reproduction, conflict and cooperation (Wolf et al. 1998). 
The central predictions of numerous verbal models of social evolution are that social behaviours 
should experience evolutionary dynamics that are frequently more rapid, more volatile, and more 
susceptible to influencing macroevolutionary patterns via divergence and diversification (West-
Eberhard 1983, 1989, 2006). However, debate about the distinctiveness of evolutionary processes 
involving social interactions has now persisted for well over a century. In the late 1800’s, Baldwin 
(1896) suggested a major role for “psycho-genetic” modifications—social flexibility in contemporary 
terminology—in producing adaptive responses at the level of an individual responding to its social 
environment, in addition to influencing macroevolutionary patterns. Seminal publications thereafter 
(reviewed by: Wcislo 1989; West-Eberhard 2006; Duckworth 2009; Bailey 2012; Bailey et al. 2018) 
have reinforced the idea that phenotypic plasticity (e.g. developmental plasticity, learning, 
behavioural flexibility) arising from variation in the social environment can cause evolutionary 
feedback that exaggerates evolutionary rates upward or downward. The influence of this debate has 
been strongest in the field of sexual selection, which can be considered a special form of social 
selection (Lyon and Montgomerie 2012), and a central focus has been on unstable conditions 
generated during trait-preference coevolution, the ‘runaway’ process first described by Fisher (1915; 
1958) and later mathematically formalised by Lande (1981). 
  
 
As envisioned by Fisher, the runaway process comprises two steps: the evolution of a stable 
equilibrium between two traits, followed by rapid coevolution resulting in exponential elaboration 
or diminution of each trait until checked by countervailing natural selection. Fisher verbally 
described this process as starting when, stochastically, a male trait variant conferred an initial 
survival advantage, was then perceived by females and elaborated through the action of female 
choice—becoming an ornament—then subsequent genetic covariance built up as a result of 
assortative mating and gametic phase disequilibrium even though the ornament conferred a fitness 
cost to its bearer and no direct benefit to females (Fisher 1915, 1958). The key characteristic of 
runaway is that it describes an unstable process and results in exponential trait elaboration or 
reduction depending primarily on the genetic variances and covariance for male and female traits 
(Lande 1981, Kirkpatrick 1982). 
Fisher-like runaway instabilities or unstable cycling in the evolution of other social traits 
have been proposed to explain evolutionary trait elaboration in social contexts (West-Eberhard 
1989; Kölliker et al. 2000; Kölliker and Richner 2001). Nesse (2007) provides an overview of social 
selection models, and argues that runaway dynamics arising from evolutionary feedbacks may 
underpin much of social evolution for traits ranging from cooperation to human self-domestication. 
An earlier quantitative genetic model of social selection (Tanaka 1997) examined runaway dynamics 
for social responsiveness and signalling traits. It re-captured social trait dynamics analogous to the 
more specific case of sexual selection models in which the relative importance of genetic 
covariances in determining runaway conditions is related to models of female preference (Lande 
1981). In the present study, we consider how genes expressed in the social environment impact 
evolutionary stability of socially-selected badge and donation traits. We consider the scenarios when 
i) the resource donation made by an individual depends on its experience of badge traits in social 
partners and ii) resource donation and badge traits reciprocally depend on each other. An example 
of the former occurs when a more intense begging behaviour elicits more provisioning by non-
parental escorts, as has been found in a communally breeding mongoose, Mungos mungo (Bell 
2008), and for the latter the more generally-found pattern of parental responsiveness to offspring 
begging and begging adjustments to obtained care (Kilner and Johnstone 1997). Partitioning 
quantitative genetic causes of trait variation into direct and indirect effects—DGEs and IGEs—
provides a useful modelling framework to consider how dynamics arising from the social 
environment impact the stability of social selection, and allow us to derive testable, empirical 
predictions for behavioural and evolutionary genetics research. 
 
  
 
Runaway Social Selection Model 
Defining the conditions under which unstable evolution is expected is a separate goal from 
establishing the expected values of coevolving traits in a population at equilibrium. In some cases, 
the only equilibrium might occur when neither trait is expressed, i.e. both average trait values are 
zero. Alternatively, there might be several equilibria, which could include a lack of trait expression, 
separated by fitness valleys, in which case focussing on equilibria does not provide answers to how 
traits shift from one equilibrium to another, an issue pointed out by Rodríguez-Gironés et al. (1996) 
in the context of offspring begging and parental care. If the conditions for unstable runaway are 
satisfied, it is theoretically possible to observe rapid exponential evolution characteristic of the 
unstable phase of the Fisher process and, in cases of multiple equilibria, social runaway may drive 
trait evolution through the fitness valleys. 
In this study, we examined whether evolutionary instabilities that characterise the Fisher 
process also contribute to the emergence and elaboration of an altruistic social trait, and whether 
such dynamics support the proposed rapid evolution of social traits in general (West-Eberhard 
1983). We adapted a quantitative genetic modelling approach to include feedback arising from the 
social environment through IGEs, focusing on the stability of coevolutionary outcomes between a 
‘donation’ trait that enhances the fitness of a conspecific and potentially decreases the fitness of its 
bearer and a ‘badge’ trait that elicits such donation in other individuals (González-Forero and 
Gavrilets 2013). In a sexual selection context, the genetic covariance between male ornament and 
female preference is of central importance for a runaway process. In a non-sexual, social context, 
satisfying this condition is more difficult. Linkage disequilibrium might be facilitated through 
population viscosity favouring assortative mating among badge loci-carrying and donation loci-
carrying individuals (Biernaskie et al. 2011), or correlational selection gradually tightening physical 
linkage of relevant loci into coadapted gene complexes (Sinervo et al. 2006; Kölliker et al. 2012). 
Our model makes three important distinctions relevant to this problem. First, we considered 
the genetic architecture of badge and donor traits to be quantitative and not sex-limited, and 
therefore influenced by the combined effects of many loci. Second, donor traits are, at least initially, 
assumed to have an independent genetic architecture from badge traits and are therefore 
genetically unlinked and freely recombining. We assume no population genetic structure or genetic 
relatedness, and consider a population of freely-mating diploid individuals. Third, we model IGEs on 
donor and badge traits, to assess the consequences of genetic variance arising from the social 
environment. We then focus on the questions of whether coevolution of donor and badge traits can 
  
 
occur via runaway dynamics, and whether IGEs arising from the social environment influence the 
scope for such social runaway.  
 
DEFINING TRAITS 
An individual’s propensity to donate resources is described by the trait   . Such donation would 
incur a direct fitness cost to the donating individual, for example by removing food or habitat 
resources that could otherwise be allocated to survival or reproduction. A recipient individual’s 
ability to gain resources from others is denoted   . Specifically,    refers to a quantitative badge 
trait that elicits resource provisioning by the donor. It is important to note that badges can take 
many forms in animals. An elicitation badge could be morphological, such as a colouration (e.g. Hunt 
et al. 2003); an acoustic signal, such as a begging vocalisation (e.g. Muller and Smith 1978); a 
behaviour or pheromone, such as the stereotyped movements and physical contact of juvenile 
burying beetles, Nicrophorus vespilloides or the cuticular hydrocarbons of juvenile earwigs Forficula 
auricularia, used to solicit food from parents (Mas and Kölliker 2008). Similar to other animal signals, 
physical badges could vary in chromatic spectrum, contrast, intensity, size, or match to an internal 
template or pattern (e.g. Lynn et al. 2019). For conceptual simplicity, we refer to badges as a physical 
property of an animal which can take different ‘sizes’, i.e. values, but behaviour such as begging 
could be similarly conceived as an elicitation signal, substituting for the badge trait    in our model. 
Traits are influenced by additive genetic effects,  , and all other non-additive and environmental 
effects,  , following standard quantitative genetic formulations: 
           (1a)  
            (1b) 
 
We consider the case where the expression of donation is affected not only by additive genetic 
effects and abiotic features of the environment, but where it is also sensitive to the social 
environment in which it is expressed. Indirect genetic effects generated by such social flexibility can 
be illustrated by decomposing the environmental contribution to    as follows: 
 
             (2) 
 
The social environment,    , comprises interactions that one focal donating individual has with a 
conspecific partner, and     comprises all other non-social effects, including stochastic 
  
 
environmental and developmental noise. For simplicity, we assume a single dyadic interaction occurs 
between these individuals. In general, therefore, the social environment can contain a genetic 
component arising from genes expressed by interacting partners (Moore et al. 1997). We consider 
the case where the propensity to donate resources depends on the interaction with the elicitation 
badge traits that are present in the social environment: 
 
             (3) 
The prime indicates that the effect arises from an interacting partner, and    is a linear coefficient 
where         and the subscript indicates that trait    influences the expression of    via the 
social environment. When    is positive, a larger badge value in a social partner causes increased 
donation over and above the direct genetic effects on donation expressed by the focal individual. 
Alternatively,    would be negative if the efficacy of an elicitation badge decreases with badge size, 
which might be expected in the case of retaliation by potential donors (Royle et al. 2002). When    
is zero, the social environment has no effect on donor trait expression and correspondingly there is 
no IGE. Consistent with prior models (reviewed in Bailey et al. 2018), we treat the interaction 
coefficient as a fixed parameter. IGEs themselves are likely to evolve (Kazancioğlu et al. 2013), but 
our aim here is to evaluate conditions under which IGEs are likely to drive runaway dynamics, as 
opposed to modeling  as an evolutionary outcome. In the following we present two models, the 
first assuming that the donation trait responds to the size of the elicitation badge, but that the 
elicitation badge is not responsive to the amount of donations received. The second model allows 
for reciprocal interactions where the donation traits responds to badge size, and badge size in turn 
responds to the amount obtained from donors. 
UNILATERAL EFFECT OF BADGE SIZE ON DONATION 
By substitution, the donation phenotype affected by IGEs, and the badge trait unaffected by IGEs, 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
                   
     
 ) (4a)  
             (4b) 
 
The primes indicate effects arising from the interacting partner, scaled by the interaction coefficient 
   . We assume physical environment effects are independent of additive effects and normally 
  
 
distributed with a mean of zero (Falconer and Mackay, 1996), and the distinction between focal and 
interacting individuals identified in eqns. (4) disappears when averaging across all individuals in a 
population (Moore et al. 1997). The expectations for mean trait values are then: 
 
   ̅   ̅       ̅  (5a)  
    ̅   ̅   (5b) 
 
SELECTION ON TRAITS 
We considered sources of selection on    and    (Figure 1). In general, natural selection should 
disfavour trait values that incur fitness costs. The marginal fitness costs associated with altruistic 
behaviours tend to increase at ever-increasing rates, such that the costs of a unit increase in the 
range of small donations may be relatively negligible but a unit increase in the range of large 
donations detrimental (Brown and Vincent 2008). We correspondingly define the donor fitness 
function using a generalized Gaussian function borrowed from the sexual selection literature (Iwasa 
and Pomiankowski 1995): 
 
    
      (6a) 
 
Positive versus negative sign of the donation trait value indicates whether donors contribute to 
partners with larger or smaller than average badge trait values, respectively. For analogous 
treatments see Lande (1981) and Pomiankowski and Iwasa (1993). The cost of donating resources 
increases as an individual donates more resources. Initial contributions have a relatively small impact 
on fitness, but this increases as the donation size increases, and the steepness of that fitness 
decrease is captured by the coefficient  . This fitness function produces a nonlinear selective force 
(Lande 1981) that can ultimately stabilise exponential evolution of donation sizes if elicitation 
badges become overly-effective. We later assess the sensitivity of the model to donation costs by 
substituting a steeper fitness function. 
The total fitness consequence of elicitation badges depends on their viability costs and 
socially-selected benefits and is defined by the fitness function: 
 
    
  ̅    ̅      
 
 (6b) 
  
 
 
Here, an interacting partner’s fitness gain is represented in the first exponential term of equation 
(6b), and depends not only on the value of his or her badge, but also on the relative deviation from 
the population average badge value     ̅ . This is further scaled by the average donation across 
the population,  ̅, and a scaling constant,  , which determines the strength of the association 
between the donation and recipient fitness. Badges are assumed to function as ‘social’ signals, and 
therefore experience natural selection in a manner analogous to other types of animal 
communication signals. Correspondingly, we adopt a symmetrical viability cost function around an 
optimum value       (Lande 1981, Pomiankowski & Iwasa 1993). Badge costs could include, for 
example, energetic expenditure in the case of begging displays, or enhanced predation costs in the 
case where a badge increases the conspicuousness of its bearer. These costs are reflected in the 
second exponent of equation (6b), where  describes how quickly these costs mount as the 
recipient’s badge increases in intensity. Defining total fitness as the product of   and   and 
assuming weak selection (Iwasa et al. 1991), partial derivatives of the natural log of fitness functions 
with respect to each trait at the population means yield selection gradients: 
 
         ̅
       (7a)  
       ̅     ̅     (7b) 
 
Figure 1. Badge and donation fitness components, with variation in scaling parameters illustrated. (A) 
Donation is costly for donors. The sign of the donation trait value indicates whether donors contribute 
to partners with larger or smaller badges than the population mean. Small donations carry relatively 
smaller costs than large donations, and the steepness of this relationship is determined by the scaling 
factor  , for which three values are illustrated. (B) Badge-displayers pay symmetric fitness cost as badge 
values deviate from a viability optimum, here given by      . These costs are scaled by the constant 
 . When  is small, selection against badges is weak and viability decreases slowly. (C) Badges elicit 
beneficial resource donation from others. Here, the fitness benefit of displaying a badge depends on 
how big the badge is relative to the population average badge size, in addition to a scaling factor  , 
  
 
which determines the marginal benefit of increased badge size. We illustrate the situation where the 
population mean badge value is equivalent to the viability optimum, i.e.   ̅    . Fitness is highest for 
benefit functions with large  , and when badges are large compared to the population mean. Note that 
the fitness benefits of displaying a badge are also scaled by the average donation trait value in the 
population,  ̅, as in equation (6b), which we assume here for illustrative purposes to be positive and 
equal to 1. The significance of this is that if most donors in the population preferentially donate 
resources to holders of relatively small badges instead, then  ̅    and social runaway could drive the 
rapid diminution or evolutionary loss of elicitation badges as the direction of selection illustrated in 
panel C would be reversed. 
TRAIT EVOLUTION 
The per-generation change in average donor and recipient traits can be modelled using Price’s 
theorem (Taylor 1996; Falconer and Mackay 1997). Following Moore and Pizzari (2005; eqn. 4) and 
McGlothlin et al. (2010; eqn. 4), the evolutionary expectation is obtained by examining the action of 
selection    on the covariance of the breeding value    and phenotypic value    for a given trait  : 
 
    ̅                (8) 
 
When IGEs are present, the total breeding value for the focal donation trait    is comprised of both 
the direct additive genetic value for the trait plus the indirect additive genetic value arising from the 
interacting partner (Moore et al. 1997), thus: 
    ̅                                           (9) 
 
In this first model, evolution of the badge trait    is not affected by indirect genetic effects. 
Substituting the trait definitions from eqn. (4a) into eqn. (9), taking covariances and grouping terms, 
and similarly treating   , gives expressions for total evolutionary change for each trait:  
 
    ̅                                  (10a) 
    ̅               (10b) 
Here,    ,    , and     are the additive genetic variances for donation and badge and their genetic 
covariance, respectively, and these are assumed to be constant. The first term in parentheses on the 
right side of equation (10a) illustrates the direct genetic component of evolution, and the second 
term illustrates the indirect genetic component modulated by     the influence of badges on 
  
 
donation. As can be seen from equation (10b), badge evolution in this model is unaffected by IGEs. 
Equations (10a) and (10b) provide a univariate model of donor and elicitation trait coevolution that 
incorporates a genetic covariance between the donor and elicitation traits, as well as IGEs caused by 
the influence of elicitation badges on donation propensity. 
 
 
EQUILIBRIUM AND INSTABILITY  
We assume that   ̅ and   ̅ are in equilibrium when there is no cross-generational evolutionary 
change in either trait, i.e.     ̅       ̅    . If the equilibrium is locally stable, then a small 
perturbation of the population away from equilibrium will result in a return to that equilibrium. 
However, evolutionary runaway away from an equilibrium occurs when a population perturbed off 
that equilibrium continues to evolve away from it. We adapted methodology described in Hall et al. 
(2000) and elsewhere (Otto and Day 2007; Matthiopoulos 2011), to perform linear stability analyses. 
For illustrative purposes we redefine equations (10a) and (10b) in terms of a system of two ordinary 
differential equations describing the generational change in donation and badge traits:  
 
    ̅          (11a) 
    ̅          (11b) 
Stability at the trivial equilibrium (0,0) in this system is more straightforward to analyse and can be 
generalised by the Hartman-Grobman Theorem (Hartman 1960), therefore we define an equilibrium 
state when              and             . We model a perturbation in both traits by including a 
small deviation away from the trait values at equilibrium and then assessing whether the population 
evolves back towards equilibrium (stable) or away from it (unstable). Using Taylor expansion of eqns. 
(11a) and (11b) and disregarding higher-order terms expected to make negligible contributions to 
stability dynamics, we construct the Jacobian matrix   of first-order partial derivatives describing the 
incremental change in donor and badge traits around the equilibrium. Eigenvalues of the Jacobian at 
the equilibrium         give an indication about the stability of the point of equilibrium. The 
Jacobian at equilibrium,   , is: 
 
    [
                                    
              
]   (12) 
  
 
 
The determinant equation  |     |     is solved to find eigenvalues of   : 
        [                        ]   (13) 
 
If any part of the eigenvalues    or    are positive, then instability around the point of equilibrium is 
indicated. Likewise, if any part contains a complex component, then the system can experience 
cyclical dynamics. The solution        corresponds to a lack of deterministic movement of the 
system at equilibrium (Lande 1981), so we focus on situations for which the root is positive, 
indicating instability. In the latter case      when: 
    
   
   
 
  
 
     (14) 
Inequality (14) defines the social runaway criterion: unstable dynamics during the joint evolution of 
donation and badge traits depends on genetic variance of badge traits, which will have a dampening 
effect on runaway, relative to the genetic covariance between donation and badge, which when 
strong will enhance the likelihood of runaway. It also depends on IGEs, indicated by the term   . 
Crucially, runaway can occur when there is no genetic covariance, provided indirect genetic effects 
of badges on donation in interacting partners are strong and positive. However, the potential also 
exists for IGEs to counteract genetic covariance, for example if badges elicit an aversive reaction in 
interacting donors. The criterion also depends on how effective donation is at increasing badge-
holder fitness ( ) and the intensity with which badge costs mount with increasing badge size ( ) 
(see Figure 1). Runaway is more likely when fitness is highly responsive to donation and when badge 
costs are relatively minor. 
 
RECIPROCAL INTERACTIONS 
There are situations in which both traits may be socially flexible, especially when both donor and 
badge trait are behaviours, such that donation by a target individual is influenced by badges they 
experience in the social environment, and elicitation itself depends on donor phenotypes that have 
been experienced. A clear example is offspring begging, where the eagerness with which offspring 
solicit food from parents depends on parental generosity (Kilner and Johnstone 1997; Royle et al. 
2012). Modelling IGEs when both    and    are reciprocally affected by one another requires 
incorporating genetic influences on each trait’s expression contributed by the other trait’s presence 
in the social environment. We assume as before that environmental effects are independent of 
  
 
additive effects and normally distributed with a mean of zero, but that both focal and interacting 
individuals are capable of expressing badge and donation phenotypes. Trait values are thus 
partitioned into direct and indirect influences for focal individuals: 
                  
     
 ) (15a) 
                  
     
    (15b) 
 
As before, donation depends in part on IGEs arising from variation in badges within the social 
environment of donors, but the expression of badge traits is now also modified by IGEs arising from 
interaction with donors.    describes how strongly interaction with badge traits affects the 
expression of donation, whereas    describes how strongly interaction with donor traits affects the 
expression of the badge, i.e. elicitation. It can then be shown (Moore et al. 1997, eqn. 12) that the 
evolutionary change in both traits is: 
    ̅  (
 
        
)
 
 [                              ]  (16a) 
    ̅  (
 
        
)
 
 [                              ]  (16b) 
Two features of this model are immediately apparent. The first is that IGEs affect the evolution of 
both traits, scaled by their respective interaction coefficients, and the second is that trait evolution 
now has an additional dependency on the interaction coefficients, which act multiplicatively in the 
denominator of the squared term of each expression. When    and    are both large and 
positive (or both large and negative), the reciprocal IGEs on badge and trait are mutually reinforcing 
and they provide an additional enhancement to trait evolution. Likewise, if their directions oppose 
one another, IGEs on one trait may cancel the effects of IGEs on the other, in which case 
evolutionary responses remain the same as they would be without IGEs, even though IGEs are 
exerted on both traits. Such a situation might arise, for example, if donors positively respond to 
badge size, and badge size decreases when donations increase. To evaluate whether these different 
dynamics introduced by reciprocal donation and badge IGEs influence evolutionary stability, a linear 
stability analysis can again be performed. 
 Establishing stability criteria uses the Jacobian    (where the subscript indicates reciprocity 
of IGEs in this case), evaluated at the equilibrium                : 
   
  (
 
        
)
 
 [
                                    
                                    
] 
  
 
(17) 
Solving the determinant equation  |  
     |     for conditions under which the leading 
eigenvalue         identifies conditions of evolutionary instability: 
          
          
 
  
 
     (18) 
Requirements for unstable coevolutionary dynamics are more complicated when IGEs are reciprocal 
(eqn. 18; Figure 2). Provided             , instability and runaway depend, as before, on the 
genetic variances and covariances between badge and donor traits, but they also depend on the 
characteristics of IGEs exerted on both traits, i.e.    and   . Runaway is still possible in the 
absence of a genetic covariance, in which case evolutionary instability is expected when    
  
 
 . 
This inequality is the same as for the non-reciprocal IGE condition (Figure 2A). However, when a 
genetic covariance is present between badge and donation traits, it allows an influence of   , and 
effectively scales this influence. 
 
STEEPER DONATION COSTS 
In the above two scenarios, we modelled social runaway using a donation fitness function which 
assumes initially negligible donation costs (Figure 1A). This was selected to reflect a situation in 
which, during the initial stages of coevolution between donation and badge traits, the negative 
fitness impacts of donation increase only shallowly until reaching a more critical threshold, reflecting 
donation traits that are relatively, and consistently, inexpensive to express for donors. However, cost 
functions themselves can evolve, and the fitness function may not remain the same over the course 
of the evolutionary increase in donation (Kölliker et al. 2012). We therefore examined stability 
dynamics of social traits experiencing non-reciprocal IGEs (the first scenario above) using a donor 
cost function in which fitness falls off more steeply as donation increases: 
 
    
          (19) 
When the steeper donation cost function in equation (19) is adopted, it can be shown (Appendix 1) 
that the social runaway criterion becomes:  
 
   [          ]
   
 
 [          ]
   
      (20) 
  
 
Conditions for evolutionary instability for donation and elicitation badge traits are now more 
complicated. When donor fitness is invariant regardless of donation size (     ), then the social 
runaway criterion is the same as that in expression (14). Otherwise, conditions for social runaway 
now depend on donation costs, reflected in the first part of the left-hand side of expression (20). As 
might be expected, the more steeply costs increase (i.e. the larger   is), then the lower the likelihood 
of unstable runaway trait evolution. Nevertheless, IGEs can play an important role in overcoming 
those costs. By evaluating the scenario presented in Figure 2, it can be shown that IGEs permit 
conditions favouring runaway even when donation costs are present under this model (Appendix 2). 
Thus, under more restrictive conditions in which donation costs mount more steeply as individuals 
donate more to badge-holders, the presence of strong IGEs can permit social runaway when it would 
otherwise not occur.  
 
 
Figure 2. The influence of IGEs on potential for social runaway. IGEs describing the influence of 
donation by social partners (   ) are plotted against IGEs describing how badges in the social 
environment change the expression of donation behaviour (   ). Shaded regions indicate where the 
social runaway criterion in expression (18) is satisfied, making unstable runaway coevolution between 
badge and donation traits possible. The dashed line indicates parity between    and   , and darker 
shading indicates instability when    >   . (A) Runaway conditions when there is no genetic 
covariance between badge and trait. Here,    = 0.4,  = 0.1, and   = 0.3, reflecting the expectation 
that the fitness costs of badges scale less rapidly than the fitness gains of expressing badges, i.e.  
 . In this scenario, the social runaway criterion is equivalent to that when IGEs are not reciprocal and 
only affect donation (expression 14), i.e. for any value of   , instability occurs when    
  
 
. (B) 
Runaway conditions with a genetic covariance. Holding the other parameters in (A) constant, this 
scenario assumes a genetic covariance between badge and donation traits of     = 0.15. The existence 
of a genetic covariance further relaxes conditions for runaway, although instability tends to be 
predicted when       , that is, when IGEs affecting donation are stronger than IGEs affecting 
badges. (C) Example of a plausible scenario in which unstable social runaway occurs when IGEs on both 
badge and donation traits are negative (      and     ; striped shading). Such conditions are 
more likely to occur when the fitness costs of badges increase very slowly with increasing badge values, 
  
 
compared to the rate of fitness gain associated with increasing badge values. In the illustration, we have 
set additive genetic variance to a moderate value of     = 0.4, genetic covariance to be moderate to 
weak with    = 0.15, the scaling coefficient for badge costs  = 0.05 consistent with an assumption of 
weak selection, and the strength of association between donation and recipient fitness scaled by   = 
0.5 (see Figure 1).  
Discussion 
THE SOCIAL RUNAWAY CRITERION 
The foregoing models provide several general insights. First, they analytically demonstrate how 
Fisherian runaway processes can drive rapid evolution of socially selected traits outside the context 
of sexual selection. Second, IGEs can play an important role in overcoming barriers imposed by 
direct selection against resource donation phenotypes (   . The inequality represented by 
expressions (14) and (18)—the social runaway criterion—defines conditions under which unstable 
coevolutionary dynamics are predicted (Figure 2). The criterion is a positivity condition for the sum 
of two independent slopes, one describing the social interaction coefficient    and the other the 
additive genetic regression slope of donation trait on badge trait, and this implies that social 
runaway can occur in the absence of genetic covariance between badge and donor traits. Instability 
in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium that we modelled, in which badges are at a viability 
optimum and donations are made to average-sized badge-holders (cf. Figure 1A), informs the 
evolutionary origins of socially-selected, potentially altruistic, traits. A steeper donation cost function 
impedes runaway (expression 20), though again this can be offset by IGEs acting on donating 
individuals. Our findings thus imply an important role for social runaway when donation has 
relatively mild negative impacts on donor fitness, which might be expected during the early 
evolutionary origins of altruistic traits (Le Galliard et al. 2005). 
The social runaway criterion bears an obvious relationship to sexual selection models, in that the 
propensity for unstable evolutionary dynamics is influenced by the magnitude of genetic variance for 
badge traits and by the genetic covariance between badge and donation traits. However, even if we 
make a restrictive assumption that no such genetic covariance can be formed by assortative mating 
in the manner proposed by Fisher (1915, 1958) and modelled by others (Lande 1981, Kirkpatrick 
1982), IGEs can nevertheless induce social runaway of badge and donor traits (Figure 2A). The 
influence of IGEs on this process is indicated by the interaction coefficient   , and unstable 
conditions are more likely when    is strong and positive. This is also generally the case when IGEs 
on donation and badge traits are reciprocal (Figure 2B). Assuming realistic conditions such as a 
moderate cost:benefit ratio of expressing a badge, moderate genetic variation in badge traits, and a 
  
 
weak genetic covariance consistent with estimates from the sexual selection literature (Greenfield et 
al. 2014), there is greater potential for runaway when IGEs on donation exceed those on badges, i.e., 
       . 
How likely is it that IGEs arise in cases of resource donation and elicitation, and that they are of a 
sufficient strength to affect the social runaway criterion? Our results highlighting the importance of 
IGEs arising from the social environment are consistent with theoretical findings that plasticity in 
partner choice can lead to runaway cooperation – but only until it reaches an optimum level where it 
is then counterbalanced by reduced payoffs (Geoffroy et al. 2019). Recent empirical studies suggest 
that IGEs on resource donation and elicitation can be of a considerable magnitude and affect the 
tempo and direction of evolutionary change. For example, in the burying beetle N. vespilloides, 
experimental evolution under different regimes of parental provisioning to offspring (donation) 
affected the heritability and response to selection of larval body size, indicating that genes in the 
social environment exert strong effects on both expression and evolution of a key fitness trait 
(Jarrett et al. 2017). These effects are mediated through resource donation and begging phenotypes 
(Jarret et al. 2017), and researchers are beginning to identify genes underlying such phenotypes, for 
example neuropeptide F (Cunningham et al. 2016). In another insect, the dung beetle Onthophagus 
taurus, females provision eggs by donating a brood mass of dung they have gathered, and IGEs have 
been shown to affect the size of this donation (Hunt and Simmons 2002). Finally, in earwigs Forficula 
auricularia, nymphs influence the likelihood that females produce a second clutch through a 
paternally inherited effect (Meunier and Kölliker 2012). 
More recent empirical work suggests that IGEs may be widespread across different behavioural, 
morphological and physiological traits, and in some cases affect trait expression more strongly than 
DGEs. In outbred lab mice, Baud et al. (2017) detected IGEs in over a third of behavioural and fitness-
related phenotypes assayed, and in nearly a fifth of those, IGEs had a greater influence on 
phenotypic expression than DGEs. Estimates of the interaction coefficient   have varied widely to 
date, suggesting significant scope for a variety of impacts on stability dynamics during social 
evolution. For example, values of  ranged from -0.96 to 0.93 in the guppy Poecilia reticulata 
(Bleakley and Brodie 2009), from -0.486 to 0.419 in a study of Drosophila melanogaster (Bailey and 
Hoskins 2014), and from 0.18 to 0.54 for different inbred genotypes of D. melanogaster (Signor et al. 
2017). The considerable variation in  reported in the literature suggests that evolutionary dynamics 
are likely to occupy a large portion of the parameter space represented in Figure 2, including 
counterintuitive situations in which IGEs cause reduction of both badge and donation expression yet 
provoke unstable runaway (striped shading in Figure 2C), or when elicitation badges are more 
  
 
socially flexible than donation (dark shading in all panels of Figure 2). Acquiring additional estimates 
of the strength and direction of IGEs on socially selected traits is therefore a key priority which will 
advance our understanding of the way IGEs might – or might not – affect evolutionary stability of 
socially-selected traits. 
Superficially, it would seem intuitive that reciprocal IGEs should increase the potential for unstable 
conditions, given their enhanced impact on evolutionary potential above and beyond that of 
unidirectional IGEs (Moore et al. 1997; Bijma 2014). However, closer examination suggests a robust 
biological interpretation for this finding. Strong and reinforcing IGEs would occur when either: 
greater badge values are stimulated by increased donation from interacting partners and interacting 
partners donate more when interacting with bigger badges, or: badges decrease with increasing 
donation and donation decreases with larger badges. In the former case, both interaction 
coefficients  are positive, and in the latter they are both negative, and standard IGE theory (eqns. 
16a and 16b) predicts that evolutionary responses should be accelerated. Understanding the impact 
of IGEs on evolutionary potential under social selection does not in and of itself inform us about the 
stability of the associated evolutionary dynamics, however, as the latter is influenced by asymmetry 
in the strength of IGEs. Observations from other coevolutionary contexts support a role for 
asymmetrical partner interactions in causing dynamical instabilities. For example, in interspecific 
coevolution, asymmetrical species interactions can not only drive unstable coevolutionary dynamics, 
but also contribute to instability across broader ecological networks (Bascompte et al. 2006). It is 
notable that asymmetrical interactions in other coevolutionary systems modulate the destabilising 
effects of trait covariances, for example when interspecific interactions involve an exploiter species 
and a victim species (Débarre et al. 2014). 
While IGEs are reciprocal in the second set of badge/donation models above—because both badge 
and donation traits are affected by IGEs—the effect of asymmetry in the strength of those IGEs on 
evolutionary stability is scaled by the genetic covariance in the social runaway criterion (eqn. 18). 
More generally, asymmetry of the Jacobian   predisposes unstable evolutionary dynamics (Leimar 
2009); in the models above, this arises owing to both IGEs and the nature of selection operating on 
badges and donation. IGEs arising from social interactions between individuals expressing badge and 
donation traits are thus implicated in the evolutionary stability of those traits, but additional non-
linearities, such as can be introduced by reciprocity of IGEs which do not scale linearly (Bijma 2014), 
or the evolution of  itself (Chenoweth et al. 2010; Bailey and Zuk 2012; Kazancioğlu et al. 2013; 
Marie-Orleach et al. 2017) can add further unpredictability to long-term evolutionary processes 
(Doebeli and Ispolatov 2014). Future work would benefit from relaxing the assumption that the 
  
 
interaction coefficient  is a fixed parameter and modelling the evolution of     and    . Evaluating 
how the joint coevolution of DGEs and IGEs influences evolutionary stability would also be of key 
importance, given empirical evidence that phenotypic effects of genes in the social environment 
may coevolve with direct additive genetic effects (Pascoal et al. 2018). 
The social runaway criterion is also determined by the overall strength of selection acting on 
badges, where  describes the gradient of natural selection against badges and   indicates how 
efficiently fitness benefits accrue to badge-holders as a result of resource donation by donors. 
Inequality (14) therefore represents a cost-to-benefit ratio in which unstable evolution is expected 
when direct genetic effects and IGEs contributed by the social environment override the fitness costs 
of expressing an elicitation badge. If badge traits are costly to produce, for example because of the 
need to sequester resources from the environment or divert allocation to other life-history traits, 
the threshold for unstable runaway dynamics will be increased and instability will become less likely. 
However, instability may be more likely at an evolutionary origin for donation and badge size when 
trait values are small (i.e. near zero), and badge costs are likely to be low. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence for such costs, although mixed for some elicitation traits. 
Carotenoid pigments, for example, are costly to sequester and process into signals (Olson and 
Owens 1998). Although IGEs could enhance the likelihood of such costly donor traits evolving 
through unstable, runaway coevolutionary feedback with badge traits, they could equally inhibit 
such evolution if    is negative, that is, when donors retaliate against large badge sizes. When 
might such a circumstance arise? If begging individuals evolve to manipulate and exploit donors, 
antagonistic selection may favour donor resistance. If resistance traits invade a population and 
depend on the detection of manipulative elicitation behaviours, it is plausible that    will tend to 
decrease with increasing values of   , that is,       In other words, more vigorous begging will 
be met with increasing resistance, causing a negative feedback from the social environment that 
lessens the probability of unstable runaway. 
GENETIC COVARIANCES AMONG SOCIALLY SELECTED TRAITS 
Despite the similarity the social runaway criterion of expression (14) suggests to sexual selection 
models, there is a fundamental difference between Fisherian dynamics in sexually-selected versus 
socially-selected trait evolution. Sexual advertisement traits and preferences expressed by the 
opposite sex will automatically generate genetic covariances provided there is heritable variation 
underlying both trait and preference in a population. If trait and preference are pleiotropic effects of 
the same loci, the covariance is implicit. If they are not, then the covariance is generated by gametic 
  
 
phase disequilibrium arising as a result of assortative mating. The origins and build-up of this 
covariance have been discussed by Fisher (1915, 1958), Lande (1981), and numerous others (see 
Mead and Arnold 2004).  
 In the case of social runaway, the establishment of the covariance     is not as 
straightforward. Firstly, donor and badge traits may not be sex-limited and can thus be expressed 
within the same individual simultaneously or at different times or life history stages. Secondly, there 
exists no obvious automatic process of generating linkage disequilibrium between donation and 
badge loci. Tanaka (1996) suggested that the requirement for a genetic covariance may be minimal 
during runaway evolution under some conditions, but it is important to note that Tanaka used a 
different definition of runaway, as: “rapid evolution to a stable equilibrium” (p. 518), as opposed to a 
process destabilizing an equilibrium and driving the co-evolution of traits beyond their equilibrium 
values, exponentially elaborating or diminishing traits away from the equilibrium, cf. Fisher (1958), 
Lande (1981), and others. In addition, Tanaka’s (1996) models did not include indirect genetic 
effects, which in our model are key for unstable runaway co-evolution in the absence of a genetic 
covariance. Thus, while stochastic population processes may generate a genetic covariance between 
badge and donation trait sufficient to satisfy expression (14), this is not guaranteed to happen as an 
emergent property of the traits themselves, as it is in a system of coevolving sexual traits and 
preferences. The main hurdle for runaway social selection is thus for the terms on the left-hand side 
of expression (14) to overwhelm the cost-to-benefit ratio indicated on the right. Apart from the 
influence of IGEs, several potential factors may mitigate this problem. 
The first is the link between social selection and kin selection. One possible source of direct genetic 
covariance between socially-selected traits is relatedness that arises in kin structured populations 
(e.g. among siblings inheriting genes underlying both donation and badge traits). These have been 
modelled elsewhere (e.g. McGlothlin et al. 2010; Queller 2011), but for our purposes it is illustrative 
to consider conditions under which relatedness contributes to runaway evolution. It has been 
previously shown that relatedness   and IGEs interact, such that the quantity 
   
    
 modulates the 
likelihood of altruistic traits evolving (expression 25 in McGlothlin et al. (2010)). Relatedness also has 
important implications for stability dynamics in our model, because it influences the expected 
genetic covariance between individuals (Lynch and Walsh 1998). For example, in the case of an 
elicitation badge and resource donation trait, the additive  additive epistatic covariance summed 
across all loci for a pair comprising a badge-bearing (  ) and donating (    individual,           , 
contributes significantly to their total genetic covariance,          . This can be expressed in terms of 
  
 
the probability that genes from the two individuals are identical by descent,      , and the total 
additive genetic variance associated with both traits (Lynch and Walsh 1998): 
                    
     
  (21) 
 
Thus, additive  additive epistatic covariance between loci influencing badge and donation traits will 
play a determining role in the magnitude of covariance between relatives (Lynch and Walsh 1998, 
pp. 144--145). Put another way, relatedness augments the genetic covariance between   and  , 
increasing the likelihood of exceeding the cost:benefit ratio defined by  and   in expression (14). 
The likelihood of social runaway is therefore predicted to be enhanced under conditions of high 
relatedness, for example in strongly kin-structured populations, or under local inbreeding. Our 
models suggest these relatedness conditions are not so strict when IGEs are strong, suggesting an 
important role of IGEs during the evolutionary origin of altruism. A careful distinction from the 
generality of Hamilton’s rule must be made: it is well-established that high relatedness favours the 
evolution of altruism. Our interest here is in the conditions favouring unstable evolutionary 
dynamics, and our argument implies that social runaway may also be favoured under high 
relatedness between donors and recipients. The relative impact of relatedness and IGEs in pushing 
badge and trait coevolution into instability is likely to be equivalent, given the symmetrical 
contributions of   and  (McGlothlin et al. 2010). 
Additional mechanisms favouring a build-up of the direct genetic covariance     include situations 
where badged recipients with strong elicitation traits preferentially associate socially with 
responsive individuals, or if responsive donors associate with eliciting recipients, both resulting in 
assortment of donor and badge trait values. The former is probably the more intuitive of the two. 
Even if mating is per se not assortative with respect to these two traits, social assortment each 
generation through behavioural preferences would create a genetic covariance if individuals tend to 
mate within groups formed through such social mechanisms. This behaviourally induced genetic 
covariance could then enhance the likelihood of social runaway, assuming that the behavioural 
preference remains stable over generations.An extreme case of this occurs with greenbeards, in 
which a genetic variant recognises copies of itself in other individuals and acts altruistically towards 
them. Under typical greenbeard scenarios, it is also possible for donor and badge traits to be 
controlled by different loci, but there is some debate about the degree to which strong linkage 
disequilibrium between them is required for greenbeard traits to successfully invade a population 
(see for example Jansen and Van Baalen 2006; Gardner and West 2010). Models of conditional 
  
 
helping behaviour also examined coevolution between resource donation traits and elicitation 
badges, i.e. phenotypic markers that indicate relatedness (Axelrod et al. 2004). Evolution of altruistic 
resource donation is also enhanced when loci underlying the traits are linked through gametic phase 
disequilibrium. Our model does not rely on badges conferring information about relatedness, but 
the influence of genetic covariance between the two traits has a common effect. In addition to 
representing a particularly stable form of kin structure, parent-offspring associations may also lead 
to a covariance through coadaptation due to selection favouring a range of equivalent combinations 
of offspring strategies to elicit, and parental strategies to provide, care, and there is now evidence 
for genetic covariances between provisioning and begging potentially driven by coadaptation across 
a range of species (Kölliker et al. 2012). 
Predictions and Conclusions 
Our findings can guide empirical work with four key predictions (Table 1). (1) IGEs and runaway 
dynamics may drive the evolution of donor and badge traits – i.e. altruistic interactions that depend 
on receiver elicitation signals more generally. (2) The social runaway criterion predicts that when 
examples of donation traits are detected in empirical study systems, they should be more 
susceptible to IGEs arising from social interactions than non-donation traits. The reason for this 
implication is that our model predicts that the unstable runaway dynamics associated with 
accelerated social trait elaboration are more likely to occur when strong, positive IGEs affect such 
traits (i.e.   >0), or in cases where IGEs are reciprocal, when        . Therefore, when we 
observe such traits, there is an expectation that their past evolution is more likely to have involved 
IGEs than for other types of traits. If it is the case that socially elaborated traits have arisen owing, in 
part, to the action of strong IGEs, such social lability may predispose the traits to manipulation and 
exploitation by social partners. (3) Genetic covariances are not required for social runaway, but they 
can enhance its likelihood. In a trivial sense, an enhanced likelihood of altruism in systems with 
significant kin structure and local relatedness is clearly predicted by Hamilton’s rule and has been 
extensively studied (Hamilton 1964; Queller 2011). However, our model of social runaway provides 
the additional prediction that IGEs should be strong in such situations: kin-selected altruism, or 
altruism evolving through other mechanisms such as greenbeard effects should involve particularly 
socially labile traits. Intriguingly, traits such as cast determination in the social hymenoptera are 
among the most dramatic examples of socially-cued phenotypic plasticity (Huang and Robinson 
1996), and neurogenesis in the eusocial mammal, the naked mole rat, has also been found to be 
highly susceptible to the social environment (Peragine et al. 2014). (4) Reciprocity of IGEs does not 
have the same effect as symmetry in the strength of IGEs, but asymmetrical strength of IGEs 
  
 
increases the likelihood of evolutionary instability and social runaway. As a result, we predict that 
elaborate, socially selected traits should tend to show reciprocal, but asymmetrical, IGEs. 
The contribution of IGEs to runaway dynamics in non-sexual, social evolution—social runaway—
informs empirical evolutionary study of traits coevolving in a variety of social contexts, not just 
reproduction. These have been the focus of much study and debate, and have stimulated entire 
fields of theoretical biology: examples include parent-offspring conflict (parental investment theory: 
Trivers 1972), extreme division of labour and caste determination (inclusive fitness and kin selection: 
Hamilton 1964), altruism (kin or group selection: Hamilton 1964; Maynard Smith 1964; Nowak 
2006). As a result of these efforts, we have an appreciation of some of the evolutionary processes 
that can maintain such traits in their present state. IGEs arising from the social environment may 
play a key role during the initial stages of such coevolution by facilitating unstable runaway 
dynamics. Our models suggest the possibility that IGEs causing runaway dynamics in non-sexual, 
socially selected traits may make an outsized contribution to such evolutionary volatility, supporting 
arguments for a role of plasticity in capacitating evolutionary change that predate the Modern 
Synthesis but continue unresolved in the contemporary field of evolutionary biology (Baldwin 1896; 
Wcislo 1989; West-Eberhard 2006; Ghalambor et al. 2015; Bailey et al. 2018).  
 
Table 1. Summary of predictions, with expectations for empirical studies  
Prediction Empirical expectation 
1 
IGEs facilitate the initial evolution of 
badge and donation traits  
De novo mutations influencing provisioning are less likely to be 
lost from populations due to drift if their expression is socially 
flexible, and affected by begging behaviours. 
2 
Donation phenotypes should be 
particularly susceptible to IGEs 
IGEs should have a stronger effect on costly donation traits than 
on badge traits. Also, the former are expected to be more 
frequently exploited by intraspecific or interspecific individuals. 
3 
Strong genetic covariances should 
accompany unstable social evolution  
In experimental evolution studies, strong badge-donation 
genetic covariance should predict extreme evolutionary 
outcomes such as extinction and rapid trait fixation. 
4 
Asymmetrical IGEs enhance social 
runaway 
Asymmetrical IGEs should be particularly common for elaborate, 
socially-selected traits, compared to less extreme socially-
selected, or non-social traits. 
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Appendix 
1. SOCIAL RUNAWAY WITH A QUADRATIC DONATION COST FUNCTION 
To evaluate the social runaway condition when selection acts more strongly on initially small 
donations, we performed stability analysis following Otto and Day (2007). We substitute the 
quadratic fitness function in equation (19) in the Main Text for the donor cost function and assume 
non-reciprocal IGEs arising from the effects of elicitation badges on donors. Eigenvalues of the 
Jacobian at the equilibrium,   
  (where the subscript indicates the Jacobian under a steeper donation 
fitness function), give an indication of stability. Thus by substitution, at                 we obtain:  
 
  
 
   
  [
                                                        
                       
]  
(A1) 
The eigenvalues         of   
  are: 
         
  √                      
 
     (A2) 
where          
  . We make the assumption that             
 . This need not always be the 
case, but is not unreasonable when         and implies |  
 |   . In this situation, instability is 
determined by the sign of the trace (Otto and Day 2007), such that unstable conditions occur when 
   . Thus the social runaway criterion becomes: 
                                                   (A3) 
With rearrangement, this takes the form of expression (20) in the Main Text: 
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      (A4) 
 
 
 
2. IGEs PERMIT SOCIAL RUNAWAY WITH COSTLY DONATION 
By evaluating the social runaway criterion in expression (A4) under the parameter values used in 
Figure 2 of the Main Text, it can be demonstrated that IGEs permit unstable evolutionary dynamics 
that would otherwise not happen. First, we consider the social runaway criterion in expression (A4) 
without IGEs by setting       : 
               
   
        (A5) 
We assume equivalent genetic variances in badge and donor traits, such that               , 
respectively, and a genetic covariance of           . As in the Main Text, fitness costs of 
expressing a badge are assumed to mount less steeply than the fitness benefits gained through its 
resource elicitation effects. Thus,   , and we let        and        . In this case, there is no 
positive value of   that satisfies the social runaway criterion. However, assuming a moderate 
positive IGE such that the experience of elicitation badges during interactions causes greater 
  
 
donation (         , then the social runaway criterion in (A4) is met when        , and the 
system is unstable. More generally, stronger IGEs allow greater tolerance of donation costs for 
runaway dynamics (Figure A1A). This effect is amplified when the covariance between badges and 
donation is greater. For example, maintaining the condition in Appendix 1 that             
 , 
letting            allows for runaway under a greater range of IGE strengths and directions (Figure 
A1B). 
 
 
 
Figure A1. The interaction between unidirectional IGEs on donation and the donation cost 
function affects the social runaway criterion. Here, selection on donation traits is modelled 
using a quadratic fitness function. The shaded region indicates values satisfying the social 
runaway criterion in expression (A4). Only positive values of   are shown. As in Figure 2 of the 
Main Text, we depict a scenario in which               ,        , and        . (A) When 
there is a weak genetic covariance between badge and donation traits (           , IGEs 
permit runaway provided the donation fitness function is not steep (shading). (B) However, a 
stronger genetic covariance between badge and donation (          ) widens the range of 
IGEs that can provoke unstable evolutionary dynamics. 
 
 
 
